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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

A. FRED FLEMING,
~
_ vs.Plaintiff and Respondent,
FLEMING FELT COMPANY,
a corporation, and
JOSEPH H. FELT and
MARIE FELT,
Defendants and Appellants.

~

Case
No. 8732

Reply Brief of Defendants
and Appellants

STATEMENrr OF FACTS
Appellants made a statement of facts in their intial
brief, therefore no further statement as such is appropriate here. However, errors and misleading inferPli<'<'S
with respect to the facts as stated by Respondent will he
discussed in the argument which follows:
1
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POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT NO. I
THE CONTRACT OF AUGUST 31, 1953, IS
NOT ONE-SIDED, INEQUITABLE OR UNENFORCEABLE.
POIXT XO. II
THE COXTRACT OF AUGUST 31, 1953, WAS
NOT INDUCED BY FRAUD.
POIXT XO. III
THERE WAS XO BREACH OF THE CONTRACT OF A"GGrST 31, 1953, JUSTIFYING
ITS RESCISSIOX.
POIXT XO. IV
RESCISSIOX OF THE COXTRACT IS
BARRED BY LACHES, ESTOPPEL AND
"\VAIYER.
POIXT XO. Y.
THE

COrRT ERRED IX GRAXTING A
.JrDG:JIEXT ~-\.XD IX .ASSESSING
IXTEHEST.
~fOXEY

~\RGr:JfEXT

POIXT XO. I

THE COXTH.:\CT OF ~\rGT'BT 31, 1953, IS
NOT O~E-SIDED, IXEQFITABLE OR UNENF<) H.( ~EABLE.
Ht·~pondl'llt

attempts to attack the contract by pointing ou1 1hn 1 although Fleming was to be general manager,
2
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he was controlled by the Felts through the Board of Directors. Respondent then refers to circumstances by
which it is claimed that Fleming's rights as general manager were violated. Respondent's argument is without
merit, for even if it were to be assumed that Respondent's
rights as general manager were interfered with, it docs
not follow that the contract was inequitable, one-sided
or illegal. The showing of a breach of contract does not
justify any finding that the contract itself is illegal. The
circumstances complained of by Fleming at most could
give rise to a claim for damages for breach or possibly for
injunctive or declaratory relief. Rescission of the contract, however, is not warranted.
The contract is set forth in full in Appellants' initial
brief (pp. 6-11). On pages 12 and 13 of his brief, Respondent dwells upon the supposed harsh and inequitable
provisions of the contract as to him. He would even have
the court believe, as stated on the bottom of page 12,
that in the event of default in payment of the Felt stock,
the contract would cause him to forfeit and lose his stock
in the corporation. Such conclusion is entirely unwarranted under paragraph 8 of the contract.
Regardless of the claim of Respondent that the contract is onerous as to him, he cannot deny that hy its
terms he was granted the following:
1. 1:3,;)12 shares of stock in the new corporation
were issued to him.
2. He was granted an option to pnr('hase the Felt
stock in the corporation for an agre<•d price.
3
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3. He was granted the right to be general manager of the corporation, subject to the limitations of paragraph 4 of the contract.
4. He was granted the right to have immediate

possession of the Felt stock in the corporation,
with a provision in connection with said stock
which precluded the Felts from negotiating,
assigning, transferring or pledging their stock.
5. He was granted the right to pay for the Felt

stock at any time, subject to a provision that
no more than 30 per cent of the price could be
paid in any one year.
Substantial rights having been granted to Respondent by
the contract, there is no justification under the authorities
cited by Appellants in their intial brief for the trial court
to grant a rescission on the ground that the contract was
one-sided, inequitable or unenforceable.
POIXT XO. II
COXTR~\CT OF ~\FGrST 31, 1953, WAS
XOT IXDrCED BY FRArD.

THE

The record shows that the claim of fraud was incidental. The memorandum decision failed to mention
fraud. The conclusions of law and judgment are silent as
to fraud. Though in paragraph S thereof, the court made
;1 finding- n~ to fraud, such finding is not sustained by the
('\·idt>JH't>. This is point l'd out in .Appellants· initial brief
at pn g-Ps 1:> 1o :?().
J~(·~pondl'llt

Sl)ts forth on page 5 of his brief the allflg-Pd misrl'pn)sl'ntntions. Tl1e sum total of the evidence
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in the record with respect thereto is quoted on pages 16
and 18 of Appellants' initial brief. Respondent has the
burden of showing that the Felts misrepresented the state
of their mind. This the Respondent failed to do. There
is no direct evidence whatsoever of misrepresentation.
Commencing on page 15 of his brief, the Respondent
claims that an action for fraud may be predicated on a
promise accompanied by a present intention not to perform. With this rule we agree, if certain other requisites
are met. However, an elaborate statement of the rule does
not substitute for the proof required to show a deceitful
state of mind.
Commencing on page 18 of his brief, the Respondent
attempts to set forth a method of proving intent not to
perform. The general statement from 51 A.L.R. 164 that
'' ... subsequent conduct and speech on the part of the
promissor may be resorted to for the purpose of showing fraudulent intent ... " only begs the question: "What
subsequent conduct and speech may be resorted to?''
The Respondent is certainly not helped by the following excerpt from the quoted portion of 51 A.L.R. 164,
which language implies facts completely different from
those of the instant case:
"Where the time which elapses between 1lw
making of the promise and the refusal to perform
it is inconsequential, and there is no change in circumstances, or the promissor does not make even
a pretense of performance .... "
5
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Of much more significance is the language of the
annotator in 51 A.L.R. 166, wherein the annotator discusses the quality of proof required:
'' ... but the facts which show the intention
not to perform the promises must be clear and unquestioned, and the courts of chancery will indulge
in no presumptions or surmises of fraud. The presumption is that a person making a representation
as to what he expects or hopes is about to take
place, in order to induce action on the part of the
person to whom it is made, acts honestly, however
extravagant such hopes might be .... ''
The terse excerpt from Cll icago T. & N. C. R. Co. Y.
Titterington, 19 S.W. 472 (Texas) suggests that when
there is '' ... not even a ... pretense of complying with
the contract ... '' a jury could find that the promissor had
no intention to perform, but even Fleming has never
made the exaggerated claim that the Felts never made
eYen so much as a pretense to perform the contract.
The record shows that the Felts tried for a period of
nearly two years to perform the contract. If any representation or promise was not fulfilled, there is a much
more obvious explanation for the failure to fulfill the
same than that of a deceitful state of mind at the outset.
Obviously the authorities cited on this point by the
Respondent are not in point. They do not apply to the
facts of this case.
The facts show that the Felts intended to retire. ~Ir.
Felt was an ('ldPrly man, too ill to testify at the trial, and

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

he is now deceased (R. 287-A). However, the Felts wanted
to han' assurance that Respondent could successfully
operate the business and that he could be able to complete
the purchase of their stock. The Respondent failed to
give them this assurance. Fleming had the contractual
assurance of the position of general manager, subject to
the limitation sof paragraph 4 of the contract. If his
duties as such were interferred with as he claims, this
interference is no basis for an inference of a deceitful
state of mind on the part of the Felts.
Nothing can be claimed for the alleged representation that the business could be purchased for $17,000.00
or $18,000.00. This occurred before the inventory ·was
taken. After the inventory was taken and the price determined, the figure of $33,267.00 was set up in the contract
and agreed upon by all the parties before signing. There
is nothing here to show a deceitful mind.
The claim of obsolescence in the Felt inventory is totally without merit and has been discussed in the initial
brief of the Appellants (pp. 25-26).
On page 21 of his brief, Respondent would have the
court infer that the representation as to retirement was
false, because the contract contains no provision for
retirement. The more obvious inference would be that
the matter of retirement was inconsquential. If it was so
important, one wonders why Fleming did not insist on a
provision therefor in the contract. He had ample opportunity, as several drafts of the contract were ma<le in an
effort to satisfy him. The record, however, is silent as to

7
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his ever-making a request for such a provision. The matter of retirement is obviously an after-thought with
Fleming, as the record is devoid of any request or inquiry
by Fleming during 22 months of operation as to when
the Felts were going to retire.
Xo inference of fraud can be drawn from the fact that
~Ir. Felt was president of the corporation. He had been
president since the corporation was organized (R. 59,
123). Again Fleming had ample opportunity to raise his
voice in opposition thereto. The position of president was
not deviously sought after or secured by ::\Ir. Felt. Fleming, in any event, was protected in his rights as general
manager by the contract itself.

10:.

~::

Any alleged statement by Mr. Felt in April, 1955,
after some 19 months of operation, that the contract was
not acceptable, is susceptible to no inference of fraud.

._., i

Counsel for Fleming states on page 21 of his brief
that as soon as Fleming tried to assert his office as general manager, he was opposed by the Felts. This statement is not true. Fleming, on cross-examination, admitted
that he acted as general manager even before the contract was entered into, and the unrefuted testimony of
l\Irs. Felt was that he never complained of interference
with his management until January~ 1955, nearly 17
months after the contract was signed- not until a finaneial statement was submitted to him evidencing that the
husiness waH not being operated profitably (R. :218, 219).
Although Fleming, on his direct examination, claims to
han~ made some recommendations at about eight months

'"
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--

I,

1--

after the contract was signed, and indicates that he was
opposed by the Felts (R. 67-69}, the uncontradicted testimony of Mrs. Felt was that there had never been any
complaint made to the Felts prior to January, 1955
(R. 220). In other words, any opposition to any of the
suggested changes by Felt did not bring forth any complaint on his part until January, 1955.
The statements made by counsel for the Respondent
on pages 17, 18, etc. of his brief, to the effect that the Felts
and Fleming were on unequal footing and that there
existed a confidential relationship in entering into the
contract is totally incorrect. Fleming was not a juvenile
totally lacking in experience. As a matter of fact, he had
been in the business of selling automotive equipment as
the" A. Fred Fleming Company" since 1949 (R. 57) and
no doubt had all the business experience normally incident thereto. The merger with the Felts did not involve
an experience in an unfamiliar field. He had, before dealing with the Felts, and even while acting as general manager of the Fleming-Felt Company, entered into private
contractual relationships for the sale of automobile parts
and supplies (R. 82-84). He insisted on several revisions
of the contract (R. 105). He studied each of them (R.
105). He admitted he knew what he was signing (R. 105).
It is obvious he knew what was in and what was not ill
the contract.
The claim of the Respondent on page 18 of his Brief
that there existed at the time of entering into the contract
a confidential relationship is novel, to say the least. The
9
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broad statement taken from 37 C.J.S. Section 35, page
283 is certainly of no help to him, for the only case cited
as authority for the suggestion that the rules applicable
to situations involving a confidential relationship might
apply to ''persons jointly entering into a business enterprise" is Teachout v. Va;nHoesen, 40 X.\Y. 96 (Iowa1888).
However, in that case the plaintiff had been the defendant's confidential business advisor, and had enjoined
secrecy in the proposed operation.
Generally, before a confidential relationship will be
found to exist between two persons, it must appear that
one has gained the confidence of the other and purports
to act or ad-vise with the other's interest in mind. While
there might have existed such a relationship after the
agreement ·was signed, when Fleming and Felt were dealing with third parties or as persons jointly interested in
the welfare of the company, surely in reaching an agreement at the outset governing their respective interests,
rights and duties, each was obliged and would be expected
to look out for his own int~rests. See Restatement of the
Law of Trusts, Sec. ~(d). Thorne Y. Reiser, 60 X.W. (2d)
IR.t, 7RR (Iowa 1953); In Re Jlcflonne77's Estate, 119
P(2d) :2:~8. :2-!1 (..:\riz. 19-!7); Tri7son

Y.

~~.:
Rn

J:~:

I:P

ll.l

Rentie 254 P. 64,

66 (Okla. 1926).
The i1lfen'nres of a deceitful state of mind, which
Ht>~pmldt'nt would like to draw from the actions of the
A ppt'llant~, are unwarranted. Rather, it would appear
that Respondent was incapable of managing the business
HlH'<'<'HHfnll~,, and therefore entered upon a. course which

10
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h,

was calculated to cast upon Appellants the blame for Respondent's failure and deficiences.
POINT NO. III
THERE WAS NO BREACH OF THE CONTRACT OF AUGUST 31, 1953, JUSTIFYING
ITS RESCISSION.
The trial court found in findings of fact numbers 7
and 11 (R. 272, Appellant's initial brief 37) that Respondent had wrongfully been deprived of his duties as general
manager. No mention is made of this in the memorandum
decision, conclusions of law or judgment of the trial court.
A discussion of these findings was included in Appellants'
initial Brief under Point 4, to avoid any possibility that
such findings might be considered by this court as a basis
for rescission.
One or two issues raised by the Respondent should
be commented upon. Counsel for the Respondent makes a
point of the fact that Mrs. Felt was re-hired after being
fired by Fleming. After being shown that the company
was losing money, Fleming was determined to assert himself and justify his conduct. This was a good time to get
rid of the Felts, and so he proceeded to fire both. Why
wait for retirement~ Fleming claims to have been able
to hire a competent bookkeeper at $200.00 per month, but
this is not the whole picture. Mrs. Felt was not only serving as a bookkeeper in the office, but was the secretary and
treasurer of the company, and Exhibit 15-D, page 9,
shows that Mrs. Felt was not re-hired by the corporation
11
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as a mere bookkeeper, but that she was voted a salary as
the secretary and treasurer of the company. (Exhibit
15-D, p. 9; R. 74, 75.)
Counsel refers to a so-called Board of Directors'
meeting in January, 1955, "when Fleming was reduced to
a sales manager.'' The meeting referred to was obviously
not a Board of Directors' meeting, and was not an official
act of the company in the slightest degree, nor did Fleming himself, or either of the Felts thereafter, pay any
attention to it. The corporate minutes do not include
this meeting (Exhibit 15-D, R. 241, 242). The matter was
dropped and Fleming continued to act as general manager (R. 242).
Furthermore, Fleming, who now complains that his
prerogatives as general manager of the company were
taken away, never, for some 19 months, held any kind of
a meeting with the Felts or met with the inside force (R.
221, 222). Never did he hold a meeting of the company
with those in the office, as is customarily done in successful businesses (R. 222).
Paragraph 4 of the contract provides, among other
things, that Fleming shall be general manager "so long
as Fleming arts in good faith for the benefit of the corporation" (Appellants initial Brief, p. 8). At the time of
the resolution in 1\[a~~, 1!155, complained of by Fleming,
strained relations lwtween the parties had existed for
SP\'ernl months. Fleming had flared up at the dinner
meeting in Janna r~', 1955, when he ·was challenged with
flgnres indicating the corporation was operating at a loss
12
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I

(R. 70, 220). Rather than approach the matter objectively, Fleming, in a spiteful manner, posted a notice in
the office of the company in full view of the public, in
which the duties of general manager were listed (R. 216217). This could have only the effect of advising the public of internal dissension in the corporation, and surely
could not be considered to be '' in good faith for the benefit of the corporation," particularly in view of the fact
that all the employees had previously been notified of
the contents of the notice (R. 216). Also, it will be recalled that Fleming fired Mr. Felt in March, 1955, and
fired Marie Felt in April, 1955. The record fails to show
that this was done in the interest of the corporation. It
appears rather to have been accomplished to satisfy the
ego and caprice of Respondent.
Thus: (1) after Fleming had functioned as general
manager for some nineteen months, (2) after it appeared
that the corporation was losing money, (3) after it appeared that the manager was not interested in objectively
approaching the problems of management but instead had
launched upon a course of action calculated to jeopardize
the interest of the corporatoin and the future security of
the Felts, and ( 4) after Fleming had secretly withdrawn
all the funds of the corporation and deposited them to his
personal account (R. 72, 73, 121, 122, 223, 224), the defendants were justified in taking an action that would
eliminate the source of the difficulty. Under such conditions we submit the action of the Board of Directors of
May 23, 1955, in passing the By-Laws (Exhibit 2-P; R.
265) complained of by Respondent was proper. In any
13
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event, this action at this late date could not warrant a
rescission of the contract.
POINT NO. IV
RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT IS
BARRED BY LACHES, ESTOPPEL AND
WAIVER.
Respondent contends, on page 32, that the defenses of
estoppel and waiver are unavailable to Appellants because they were not pleaded. While the word ''estoppel''
is not used in the pleadings, we invite this court's attention to the facts pleaded in paragraph 15 of Defendants'
answer to Plaintiff's First Cause of Action (R. 20).
'' 15. If the plaintiff relied on any representations of defendants or any of them, the plaintiff is
barred by his own laches from praying for a
rescission of the contract, and for damages for
breach thereof, in this: that plaintiff's agent participated in taking the inventory alleged by plaintiff to contain obsolete material, and plaintiff, who
acted as general manager of the defendant corporation from August 31, 1953, until June 8, 1955,
had access at all times to the stock in trade of the
defendant corporation, and to the inventory of the
said stock in trade and the prices of each individual item, which inYentory was on plaintiff's desk
for long periods of time; that the said inventory
was nYaila hle to plaintiff prior to plaintiff's signing the contract and thereafter; that since August
31, 1953, until June 8, 1955, the combined inventory
of the said stock in trade of the plaintiff and defendant company has materially changed, and because of the mismanagement h~~ the plaintiff of the
defendant company the balance of the assets and
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i n..

liabilities of the defendant company is less than
it was prior to the addition of the inventory ()f
plaintiff.''

It is recognized that waiver and estoppel are affirmative defenses. However, Appellants contend that whether
they were pleaded or not, they are now issues before this
court undr Rule 15 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads in part as follows:
''When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
by expreess or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues.''
The evidence relied upon by Appellants in this connection was admitted without objection. This being true,
Respondent is deemed to have consented to the introduction of the issues of waiver, estoppel and laches in this
case. Under this rule, Appellants contend that these
issues are now before this court without amendment.
The said portion of Rule 15 (b) is identical to Federal Rule 15 (b) under which it is clear that the issues of
waiver and estoppel are before this court.
Commenting on Rule 15(b), Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 3, page 846, states :
"While an amendment to conform to evidence may
be made at any time on motion of any party, even
15
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in the appellate court, the lack of an amendment
does not affect the judgment in any way. In effect,
therefore, the parties may, by express consent, or
by the introduction of evidence without objection,
amend the pleadings at will.''
Supporting authorities are cited, among which is
Gulf Smokeless Coal Co. v. Sutton, Steele & Steele, 35 F.
( 2d) 433 ( CCA 4th, 1929), wherein the court held that the
plaintiff could amend in the appellate court to conform to
proof, or the appellate court could consider the amendment as made. See also Globe Liquor Co. v. San Romwn,
160 F. (2d) 800, (CCA, 7th, 1947); Continental Illinois
National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago Y. Ehrhart, 127 F.
(2d) 341, (CCA 6th, 1942).
In the case of Fifth Avenue Ba;n.k of New York v.
Hammond Realty Co., 130 F (2d) 993, (CCA 7th, 1942),
certiorari denied, 63 S. Ct. 666, 318 U. S. 765, 87 L. Ed.
1136, it was held that on appeal the pleadings would be
deemed amended to meet the proof. The court, in AetM
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Rhine, 152 F. (2d) 368, (CCA 5th 1945),
held that on appeal, evidence rather than pleading would
be regarded. Likewise it was held in Katz Drug Co. v.
Katz, 89 F. Supp. 528, (D.C. l\Io. 1950), that the issue of
laches, though not pleaded, would be treated as if properly raised where evidence in the record clearly established such a defense.
It is claimed on page 24 of Respondent's brief, that
laches and t·~toppcl require more than mere delay. And
more thcrr was! Of course, the Felts were prejudiced by
the dPln~r. The iH\'PntoriPs \\·ere being comingled and
16
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'

t~

intermixed. Rescission would become increasingly more
difficult. Furthermore, if there were grounds for rescission, Fleming, under the judgment as granted, was continually benefiting from his failure to take any action.
Money was constantly being paid out for his salary, pursuant to the terms of the contract, and not in accordance
with what might have been a reasonable value for his
services. Shares of stock belonging to the Felts were tied
up and in his possession.
As already pointed out in Point No. III of the appellant's initial Brief, Fleming was affirming the contract
right up until June, 1955 - nearly 22 months after the
commencement of operations. Under the Utah cases cited
by the appellants, Fleming is precluded from seeking a
rescission. Fleming continued to benefit from the contract, for he held onto the Felts' shares of stock, retained
his option to purchase the shares and continued to receive his salary of $400.00 per month. There is no evidence to show that he performed services for which he
was entitled to receive $400.00 per month absent the contract. In other words, the salary he received was payment pursuant to the contract, a benefit received under
the contract and cannot be considered a quantum meruit
return for services performed. While it might be argued
that Fleming might be entitled to reasonable compensation for his services, and that the receipt of such would
not be a legal benefit, the fact remains that Fleming
received $400.00 per month pursuant to the contract.
There is nothing to show that his services warranted such
compensation. On the contrary, the financial statement,
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Exhibit 12-P (R. 265), indicates that his services were
worth but little.
Counsel for the Respondent blandly claims that the
Felts were not injured. However, in March, 1955, Fleming fired Mr. Felt and put him right out of the business
(R. 74, 223). This one act alone conclusively shows that
in spite of Fleming's claims to the contrary, he asserted
his prerogatives as manager. What better evidence of
his authority and power to assert the same could be
asked~ This was an unambiguous affirmance of the contract. It was not nullified in the least. Mr. Felt never
came back into the business, and certainly this was an
obvious detriment to the Felts. "Felt, however, decided
to go . . . '' says the respondent on p. 7 of his Brief.
We are confident the court will not be impressed with
Respondent's futile attempt to gloss over this glaring episode.
Fleming, by waiting nearly two years to seek a rescission of the contract, while the inventories were being comingled and intermixed, by continuing to draw his salary,
by firing Mr. Felt and putting him out of the business,
created a situation which clearly estopped him from seeking a rescission of the contract.
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I,;

POINT NO. V.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A
MONEY JUDGMENT AND IN ASSESSING
INTEREST.
Respondent says, on page 37 of his Brief, that "it
was evident to the court that defendants could not restore
what plaintiff contributed in specie and it was impracticable to decree a restoration of the property." Such a
statement is contrary to the evidence (R. 132, 133, Appellant's initial Brief, 45-47). If rescission is proper, the
court should allow a return of property in kind insofar as
this is possible. This is possible in two ways: (1) the
return of that part of Fleming's original goods not sold,
and ( 2) the return of merchandise on hand identical to
stock furnished by Fleming and sold.
On page 39 of his Brief, Respondent cites Kimball v.
Salt Lake City, 32 Ut. 253, 90 P. 395 at page 261, and
Fell v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P.
1003, in support of his claim for interest. Neither of the
cases is in point. The Kimball case was an action for
damages for changing the grade in the street in front of
plaintiff's property. The Fell case was also for damages
for injury to livestock in transit. Neither was an equitable action. Neither involved facts even remotely resembling the instant case. The case at bar is one for
rescission involving equitable principles.
Respondent had the use and benefit of this property,
the value of which the trial court has assessed interest
upon in the operation of the business until the time he left.
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In addition, he had income from it during all the period
in which the court assessed interest. Under circumstances
as existed in this case, equity will not award him interest
in addition.
CONCLUSION
Respondent has failed to justify affirmance of the
judgment of the trial court. Appellants maintain that
there is no basis for a rescission of the contract as set
forth in the first three points herein. However, if rescission is otherwise proper, the remedy is not available to
Respondent by reason of laches, waiver and estoppel,
and finally, if for any reason the court considers rescission a proper remedy, then true equitable principles
should be applied in restoring the parties to their original
position. Interest should be eliminated, and Appellants
should be allowed to return property in kind to Respondent. Fleming, who never put so much as one dime of cash
into the business, should never be allowed by a court
of equity to get $16,000.00 cash out of it.
Respectfully submitted,
McKAY, BURTON, !fcMILLAN &
RICHARDS and HAROLD R. BOYER
Attorneys for Defendants and
Appellants
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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